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the measure of damages to which the customer is entitled is the highest value
which the stock may attain between the date of the conversion and a reason-
able time after noticel" thereof.'1 Third, a reasonable time is that period in
which the customer could after notice of the conversion go into the market
and purchase like shares of stock as those converted by the broker.-0 Fourth,
this period is a question of law and hence determined by the court,1" it norm-
ally being a period of fifteen to sixty days depending upon the circum-
stances.
20-
E. M. Blumenthal.
APPEALS BY THE COMMONWEALTH IN CRIMINAL CASES
Lawyers as well as legal teachers and students undoubtedly will recog-
nize the importance of the Court's holding in the recent case of Common-
wealth v, Simpson, as to the right of the Commonwealth to appeal in criminal
cases. It marks a step forward in the protection of both personal and
property rights. Quoting from the decision-
"This is what we intended when we said in Commonwealth v. Wal-
lace, 114 Pa. 405,411, 6 Atl. 685, 687, 'For error in quashing an indict-
ment, arresting judgment after verdict of guilty, and the like, the Com-
monwealth may remove the record for review without special allowance
of the proper writ'. By the words 'and the like' we meant cases in which
the ruling is against the Commonwealth on pure questions of law. Our
determination is therefore that the Commonwealth has the right to ap-
peal."
'Notice of conversion may be actual or constructive. In other words, the customer may
acquire notice of the conversion by written or oral information from the broker or, the circum-
stances may he such that although the customer has received no actual notice he could not
have possibly been ignorant of it.
Dimock v. U. S. National Bank, 55 N. 1. L. 296 (1893); Galigher v. Jones, 129 U. S. 193
l 88); \,ayer v. Monzo, supra note 14.
17Supra note 7; Act of 1929, P. L. 476.
18Supra notes 7 and 12.
-'Supra note 7; Act of 1929, P. L. 476.
-"Supra note 14.
1310 Pa. 380, 165 Atl. 498 (1933) where the Commonwealth appealed from an order of
the lower court in overruling its demurrer to plea of former jeopardy entered by defendant to an
indictment of murder on which he was about to be tried, giving judgment for him on the plea
and discharging him from the indictment.
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It should not be believed that the Court arrived at this holding in easy,
logical steps. Indeed their path was anything but straight and narrow for
the few but varied decisions in other states tend to confuse rather than to en-
lighten and lead.
Unknown to the early common Law, appeals by the state in criminal
cases are now recognized in practically every state in the union. But pre-
sumedly because there was no precedent given us by England on which to
lean, thereby forcing each state to shift for itself, the answers to the question
as to when the state can appeal in criminal cases have been varied and dis-
similar as well as limited. It is the purpose of this note to review briefly the
situation in the United States with greater emphasis placed upon the Penn-
sylvania cases on the subject.
In England appeals by either the defendant or the crown were not re-
garded as a vested right until the statute of the 3rd of Queen Anne.' It was
not until the English Criminal Appeals Act of 1907 that the defendant was
given the right to appeal from a verdict of guilty. 4 and since no act has given
the Crown the right to appeal, it is unknown.:
In the vanguard of the American States is Connecticut, There it has
been held, both under a decision of the Supreme Court of Errors" and an act
of the Legislature,7 that the State has the right to appeal on all questions of
law and after a reversal can even bring the defendant to trial again.
Directly opposite is the holding in Minnesota where the State cannot appeal
under any conditions or circumstances;" Massachusetts,' Texas," ' and Illinois"
where the same is held; and Georgia where the State cannot appeal from the
judgment of an intermediate Appellate Court overruling an original verdict of
guilty.'2
2Rex v. Wilkes, 98 Eng. Rep. 327 (K. B. 1770).
'Lord Mansfield in the case of Rex. v. Wilkes. 98 Eng. Rep. 327, 340, (K.. B. 1770) says,
"Writs of error in criminal cases are (were) not grantable ex debito justitiae but ex gratia
regis" previous to this time.
4Stephen, General View of Criminal Law, (2nd ed. 1881) 171.
51 Chitty Criminal Law at 660. An only exception to this is where the accused has
practiced fraud on the Crown during the trial.
,!State v. Lee, 65 Conn. 265, 30 Atl. 1110 (1894).
7Conn. Gen. St. (1930) Sec. 6494.
GState v. McGrorty. 2 Minn. 224 (1858); State v. Johnson. 146 Minn. 468. 177 N. W.
657 (1920).
9Com. v. Cummings, 3 Cush. (Mass.) 212, (1849).
1OPrescott v. State, 52 Tex. Cr. App. 35, 105 S. W. 192 (1907).
lPeople v. Barber, 348 I11. 40, 180 N. E. 633 (1932).
'2 State v. B'Gos,-Ga.-; 165 S. E. 566 (1932) seems to indicate that a writ of error can
not be sued out by the state in any criminal case unless under a right conferred by statute.
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Between these states are the decisions and statutes in other states provid-
ing for appeals by the State in a limited number of cases. The most common
of these are from (I) an order setting aside or quashing an indictment or in-
formation, (2) an order sustaining a demurrer to an indictment or infornia-
tion, (3) an order arresting judgment after verdict of guilty on any ground,
(4) an order granting a new trial. Statutes in twenty-one states allow ap-
peals by the State in one or all of these instances.- When the statute is not
express in its declaration that the State can appeal in all these instances, the
Courts have so interpreted the statutes as to exclude those not expressly set
forth.14 In only two states, Pennsylvania and South Carolina,"! can the
State appeal without the right being conferred by a statute. A few states
allow appeals only in case of major offenses 17 and a few more only in case of
minor offenses.s
U. S. v. Sanges"' laid down the rule that the United States has no right
to appeal a criminal case of any grade after judgment for the defendant below.
The Court subsequently followed this ruling in the case of U. S. v. Bur-
roughs.. 0  But here they enumerated the three exceptions as provided in the
Criminal Appeals Act of 1907. These exceptions are-(l) Decisions quash-
ing an indictment or sustaining a demurrer to an indictment based upon the
invalidity or construction of the statute on which the indictment is founded.
(2) decisions arresting judgment for insufficiency of the indictment, based
upon such invalidity or construction of the statute, (3) decisions sustaining a
special plea in bar when the defendant has not been put in jeopardy.
II
One of the earliest cases in Pennsylvania on the subject of the right of
the Commonwealth to appeal is Commonwealth u. Taylor."l There the de-
fendant was indicted for forcible entry and malicious mischief. The lower
13See Feinberg's note in 10 N .Y. L. Q. R. 373, 376.
14State v. Weathers, 13 Okla. Cr. 92, 162 Pac. 239 (1917); State v. Minnick, 33 Ore.
158. 54 Pac. 223 (1898); State v. Key, 93 Miss. 115, 46 So. 75, (1908).
15Com. v. Wallace, 114 Pa. 405, 6 Atd. 685, (1886). A full discussion of the Pennsyl-
vania cases will be given later.
lOState v. Bouknight. 55 S. C. 353, 33 S. E. 451 (1899) allowing an appeal from quash-
ing of an-indictment; and State v. Long. 66 S. C. 398, 44 S. E. 960, (1903) allowing an ap-
peal from a judgment reversing a conviction on the ground there was no basis for the indict-
ment.
17State v. Harrison. 154 La. 1011, 98 So. 622, (1923); City of Sheridan v. Cadle, 24
Wyo. 293, 157 Pac. 892, (1916): State v. Adams, 142 Ark. 411, 218 S. W. 845 (1920).
'sCom. v. Trail, 146 Ky. 109, 152 S. W. 202, (1912); Com. v. Gritten, 180 Ky. 446, 202
S. W. 884 (1918).
19144 U. S. 310, 36 L. Ed. 445 (1892).
20- U. S. -, 77 L. Ed. 685, (1932).
215Binney (Pa.) 277, (1812).
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Court arrested judgment after a verdict of guilty. The Commonwealth took
an appeal and the lower Court was reversed. Nothing was said about the
right of the Commonwealth to appeal. The Court seemingly assumed that
the Commonwealth had the right to appeal. This implied ruling that the
Commonwealth has the right to appeal from an order arresting judgment
after a verdict of guilty, has been followed many times. - '
In Commonwealth v. McKisson'-3 the lower Court quashed the indictment.
The Commonwealth took an appeal and succeeded in having the lower Court
reversed. This case was followed in Commonwealth v. Wallace 4 which is a
leading and important case on the subject in Pennsylvania. There the de-
fendant was indicted for false pretenses. The lower Court quashed the in-
dictment. In sustaining the Commonwealth's appeal, the Supreme Court said
at page 411,
"To erroneous decisions made in the trial which may cause the ac-
quittal of the accused, except in the three misdemeanors already men-
tioned (nuisance, forcible entry and detainer, and forcible detainer), the
Commonwealth cannot except and such decisions cannot be reviewed.
But for error in quashing an indictment, arresting judgment after verdict
of guilty, and the like, the Commonwealth may review the record for
review without special allowance of the proper writ."
These and many other cases:" definitely establish the right of the Com-
monwealth to appeal from an order quashing an indictment.
The right of the Commonwealth to appeal from a defendant's demurrer
to the evidence is recognized in Pennsylvania. The earliest case is
Commonwealth v. Parr.2 " There the defendant's demurrer was sustained.
The Commonwealth took an appeal and the lower Court was reversed. This
right is now well established.
27
2 Com. v. Jackson, 1 Gr. Pa. 262 (1855); Com. v. Moore, 99 Pa. 570 (1882); Com. v. Wal-
lace, 114 Pa. 405 (1886); Com. v. Fulton, 263 Pa. 336 (1919); Com. v. Bateman, 92 Pa. Super.
Ct. 53 (1927); Corn. v. Sexton, 107 Pa. Super. Ct. 69 (1932); Com. v. Kline, 107 Pa. Super.
Ct. 594, (1933); Com. v. Simpson, 310 Pa. 380, (1933).
28 S. &R. (Pa.) 420, (1822).
24114 Pa. 405, (1886).
25Com. v. Church, 1 Pa. 105 (1845); Coi. v. Heikes, 26 Pa. 513 (1856); Com. v. Haas,
57 Pa. 443 (1868); Com. v. Bartilson, 5 Pa. W. N. C. 177 (1877); Com. v. McHale, 97 Pa.
397 (1881); Corn. v. Sober, 15 Pa. Super. Ct. 520 (1901); Com. v. Carlucci, 48 Pa. Super. Ct.
72 (1911); Com. v. Haines, 57 Pa. Super. Ct. 616 (1914); Corn. v. Ross. 58 Pa. Super. Ct.
412 (1914); Com. v. Scott, 88 Pa. Super. Ct. 68 (1926); Corn. v. Wooden, 94 Pa, Super. Ct.
452 (1928); Com. v. McDermott, 94 Pa. Super. Ct. 470 (1928); Com. v. Vance, 99 Pa.
Super. Ct. 40 (1930); Com. v. Simpson, 310 Pa. 380 (1933).
265 W. & S. (Pa.) 345 (1843).
-7CoM, v. Capp, 48 Pa. 53 (1864); Com. v. Wallace, 114 Pa. 405 (1886); Corn. v.
Kolsky, 100 Pa. Super. Ct. 596 (1930); Corn. v. Simpson, 310 Pa. 380 (1933).
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The Act of May 19. 1874, P. L. 219 provides that the Commonwealth
may except to any decisions or rulings of the Court in cases charging the of-
fenses of nuisance, forcible entry and detainer and forcible detainer. While
this provision of the Act of 1874 was repealed by the Act of a I1 16o,
P. L. 67, the Courts have constantly recognized the right of the Common-
wealth to appeal in cases involving a nuisance 21 and forcible entry and de-
tainer or forcible detainer." Commonwealth u. MfcNaugher:  allowed an ap-
peal in a nuisance case and then reversed the judgment of the lower Court
which had been entered on a verdict of not guilty.
Also the Commonwealth has the right to appeal where a new trial has
been granted on a question of law. In Commonwealth v. Curry" the defen-
dant was indicted for violating the Pure Food Law. The lower Court set
aside the verdict of guilty on a motion for a new trial. The constitutionality
of the law was the issue involved. The Superior Court reversed the lower
Court and said that this was an instance where the words "and the like" in
Commonwealth v. Wallace:'- applied. In Commonwealth v. Sobel3o the defen-
dant was convicted on the second count in the indictment. The lower Court
granted a new trial and then sustained a plea of autrefois acquit because the
defendant had been acquitted on the first count. The Commonwealth's ap-
peal was allowed and the lower Court reversed, the Superior Court feeling it
involved a question of law. If the granting of a new trial is based solely on
a question of fact, however, the Commonwealth can not appeal.
3
4
The Commonwealth has appealed in another isolated instance in Penn-
sylvania. In Commonwealth v. Reed the defendant was indicted for rob-
bery. With the consent of the private prosecutor but against the wishes of
the District Attorney a nolle prosequi was entered. The District Attorney
took an appeal which was allowed on the ground that he had not consented to
it and a nolle prosequi does not act as an acquittal.
While the Commonwealth can appeal in the aforementioned cases, it
can never appeal from a verdict of "not guilty" (except in the cases of nuis-
ance, forcible entry and detainer and forcible detainer where the Common-
wealth has the complete right of review3-) whether the verdict is the result of
2SCom. v. Wallace, 114 Pa. 405 (1886); Corn. v. Bradney, 126 Pa. 199 (1889); Coin. v.
Cassell, I Pa. Super. Ct. 476 (1896); Com. v. Simpson. 310 Pa. 380 (1933).
--Com. v. Wallace, supra; Coin. v. Simpson, supra; Corn. v. Heiland, 110 Pa. Super. Ct.
188, 167 Atd. 439 (1933).
30131 Pa. 55 (1890).
314 Pa. Super. Ct. 356 (1897).
:*2114 Pa. 405 (1886).
: 94 Pa. Super. Ct. 525 (1928).
4Com. v.. Supansic, 93 Pa. Super. Ct. 111 (1927).
3--65 Pa. Super. Ct. 91 (1916).
31!Com. v. Wallace, 114 Pa. '405 (1886).
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an error on the part of the jury or the Court in stating the law : r or an error
on the part of the Court in directing an acquittal.;"
III
The desirability of appeals by the state is fast becoming more widely
recognized. The American Law Institute's "Code of Criminal Procedure'
recommends five instances in which the state should be given the right to ap-
peal; namely, from
1. An order quashing an indictment or information or any count
thereof.
2. An order granting a new trial.
3. An order arresting judgment.
4. A ruling on a question of law adverse to the State where the defend-
ant was convicted and appeals from the judgment.
5. The sentence, on the ground that it is illegal.
It is submitted that the views of these men are far ahead of the prevail-
ing viewpoint.
One of the reasons most frequently advanced against giving the state the
right to appeal in criminal cases is the doctrine of double jeopardy. Inserted
in the Federal Constitution and followed in practically all of the State Consti-
tutions, this doctrine decrees that no man shall be twice put in danger of loss
of life or limb for the same offense. The U. S. Supreme Court in Ex Parte
Lange" so interpreted "life or limb" as to extend protection against double
jeopardy to all criminal offenses. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has not
followed this interpretation. The Pennsylvania view, as reiterated in Com-
monwealth v. Simpson," has been that "life and limb" only applies to those
cases in which life or limb is actually in danger, i.e., first degree murder. Cer-
tainly this view of double jeopardy will remove barriers blocking appeals by
the state. More freedom in appealing by the state will mark a great step
forward in the more successful enforcement of our criminal law.
Having eliminated double jeopardy as an objection to appeals by the
;;-Com. v. Steimling, 156 Pa. 100 (1893); Corn. v. Coble, 9 Pa. Super. Ct. 215 (1899);
Com. v. Stillwagon, 13 Pa" Super. Ct. 547 (1900); Corn. v. Long, 276 Pa. 154 (1923); Corn.
v. Preston, 92 Pa. Super. Ct. 159 (1927); Corn. v. Ahlgrim, 98 Pa. Super. Ct. 595 (1930).
38Com. v. Weber. 66 Pa. Super. Ct. 180 (1917); Com. v. Heiland, 110 Pa. Super. Ct. 188,
167 Ad. 439 (1933).
:;qOficial Draft, June 15th, 1930, Sec. 428, Pg. 155.
4'18 Wall. 163, 21 L. Ed. 872 (1873).
41310 Pa. 380 (1933).
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state in all cases save first degree murder in Pennsylvania, we are confronted
with the plea of autrefois acquit. Briefly the plea of autrefois acquit is this
-once having been acquitted, the defendant cannot again be brought into
Court and tried anew for the same oifense. This plea is not protected ty
the Constitution nor does its existence depend upon statute, being a common
law plea in origin and existence. That being so, the plea could be wiped out
by a decision of the Supreme Court. But having been enunciated so un-
equivocably and emphatically as a valid plea by that tribunal, it is a little too
much to expect a complete reversal. Therefore the more logical means of ex-
tinguishing it is by legislative enactment. While there appears to be noth-
ing to prevent this, yet the Pennsylvania Constitution provides in Article I,
Section 6 that "trial by jury shall be as heretofore, and the right thereof re-
main inviolate." We are immediately met by the objection that abolition of
autrefois acquit would be a violation of this provision of the constitution. It
is at least debateable whether this objection is tenable. It may be argued
that the finality of the verdict of the jury was meant to be protected only by
the double jeopardy provision of the Constitution and that the right of trial
by jury does not include the element of finality."" Limits of space forbid any
extended discussion of this interesting topic. It is submitted that abolition of
autrefois acquit and allowance of appeals by the state, at least when pure
questions of law are involved, would be an advanced step in creating more
efficiency in our criminal Courts. Especially is this not to be abhorred when
we consider that the jury is no longer held in the awe and respect it was a
century or two ago.
Nor does the fact that it will occasion too many appeals, too great delay,
expense and hardship, as some say. appear to be of great weight when we
consider the good that will result to the people as a whole. Should it not be
deemed to be the wisest policy to apply the law so as to derive the greatest
good to the largest number of people? Whatever hardship may be experi-
enced by the individual will be more than offset by the benefit to the people
as a whole and the increased esteem in which the administration of the law
will be held by the people, an esteem for which those connected with the law
are forever striving. In the words of Justice Schaffer in Commonwealth v.
Simpson:4 '
"The criminal law must move forward to meet the new conditions
which confront organized society if its law-abiding members are to be
protected in their personal and property rights. Whatever the rule may
have been in the past decades, we think now. when there is such wide
i2Smith v. Times Publishing Co., 178 Pa. 481 (1897): Coin. v. Collins, 268 Pa. 295
(1920); 17 C. J. 44, Sec. 3318.
4a3l0 Pa. 380 (1933).
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latitude allowed those convicted of crime to appeal and have their con-
viction reviewed, there should be a corresponding liberalizing of the at-
titude towards the Commonwealth where the defendant has been con-
victed and the question ruled against the Commonwealth, as here, is pure-
ly one of law."
It appears that more good than harm will result from an extension of the
right of the state to appeal in criminal cases at least where the question in-
volved is one purely of law, no matter at what time during the trial the ques-
tion may have arisen.
Joseph L. Kramer.
CORPORATE STOCK AS TRUST PROPERTY IN NEW JERSEY
In the recent case of Vaterhouse's Est.. 308 Pa. 422, 162 Atd. 295. Justice
Kephart again set forth the Pennsylvania rules as to apportionment of stock
dividends, stock rights. etc.. in cases where a trust is created for life tenant
and remaindermen. For the purpose of this article, the following outline of
these rules will be followed:-
1. Basic rule : "The value of a trust estate, where its income is to be paid
to life tenants with remainder over is determined as of the time the testator
dies or when trust is created and is the intact value."
a. Prima facie, intact value is book value.
b. Intact value is subject to capital increases and losses. Burden of proof
is on the person asserting a change.
2. Rules of distribution ,
a. Ordinary cash dividends belong to life tenants, and are not "in ab-
sence of unusual circumstances, apportionable."
b. Extraordinary cash dividends; stock dividends.
(I) Presumption that same belong to life tenant.
(2) When following of such presumption would impair the intact
value, there must be apportionment.
(3) When extraordinary dividends come from capital increases, such
dividends belong to the corpus.
c. Sale of stock, producing income, at greater than intact value.
(1) Presumption is that proceeds belong to corpus.
